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Is inflation targeting preferred by Filipinos?  
Edsel L. Beja, Jr.∗ 
 
Abstract  
Analysis of World Values Survey 2000 data for the Philippines finds that lower income Filipinos 
are more likely than the upper income ones to support inflation targeting. The same can be said 
of older, healthier, and employed Filipinos but not of the educated and financially satisfied ones. 
Given the profile of people who preferred inflation targeting, the shift from monetary targeting to 
inflation targeting is deemed a pro-poor policy shift. Further analyses find that, in 2000, at least 
53.1% of Filipino households preferred inflation targeting; in other words, the preference of 
Filipino society in 2000 was in line with the preference of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for 
inflation targeting.  
Keywords: Inflation targeting, central bank policy, Philippines, Filipino preference 
JEL Codes: C83, D12, E31 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The adverse impact of inflation on economic welfare is well understood (c.f., Easterly and Fischer 
2001, Di Tella et al. 2001, and Dollar and Kraay 2002). Moreover, high inflation produces 
uncertainties that, in turn, discourage private enterprises and jobs creation. Even a cursory review 
of history will find that reductions in economic welfare due to very high inflation induce social 
dissatisfaction and resentment, which trigger demands for regime change (c.f., Przeworski et al. 
1996, and Diskin et al. 2005). Governments, therefore, know that controlling inflation is a very 
crucial economic policy issue. 
 Developments since the early 1990s point to a shift in the management of inflation; more 
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and more governments have opted to use inflation targeting instead of monetary targeting.1 Under 
inflation targeting, the central bank projects a target inflation rate at period t – there is usually an 
upper and lower range of inflation – then deploys monetary tools to influence economic activities 
in the hope that price movements yield an inflation rate that is within the desired range. The target 
is reasonably low but credible so people are not only sufficiently confident that private objectives 
(e.g., realization of profits, protection of wealth and private property, pursuit of business plans, 
etc.) are realized but also secure that policy-makers are conscious of avoiding actions that lead to 
abrupt fluctuations in prices, thereby precluding undue reductions in economic welfare or surge in 
political instability. Of course, there are many variations in the application of inflation targeting 
across countries. 
 In the Philippines, the decision to shift to inflation targeting was made in January 2000, 
but its implementation started in January 2002.2 Two years were spent for technical preparations 
and public discussions throughout the country. Beja (2008) and Lim (2008), for example, are 
nuanced in their analyses of Philippine inflation targeting, pointing out that the issue lies not in 
the determination of the target per se, the acceptable range of inflation, the use of monetary tools 
to influence economic activities, the technical capacity of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) 
to implement the policy, etc; rather, the issue is that successful targeting is largely contingent on 
the external circumstances, which are more consequential in affecting domestic price movements 
especially because a significant part of the economy depends on imports. When the external 
conditions are not benign, inflation will be pushed outside the acceptable range, and the BSP 
would fail to achieve the inflation target. Similar results happen with domestic supply bottlenecks 
and production-related problems. Needless to say, scholars of the Philippine economy understand 
                                                 
1 Inflation targeting was introduced by New Zealand in 1990. To date, the following countries have adopted 
inflation targeting: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and United Kingdom. 
2 See Valdepeñas (2004) and Guinigundo (2005) for an institutional view on inflation targeting. 
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why between 2002 and 2009 inflation rate was within the target range only in 2009. However, an 
innovation built in Philippine inflation targeting is the requirement that the Governor of the 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas sends a report to the President of the Republic of the Philippines to 
explain why the inflation target was missed and then convey the steps to be taken in order to 
bring inflation within the acceptable range. 
 This paper does not examine Philippine inflation targeting per se. The focus is the so-
called “beneficiaries” (i.e., the Filipinos) of inflation targeting. There is no question that BSP has 
the mandate and authority to decide on the appropriate monetary policy to achieve “price stability 
conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy” (c.f., Article 1, Section 3, 
Republic Act No. 7653). There is also no question that BSP has revealed its preference for 
inflation targeting. Even so, as an exercise in policy validation in the context of “effective and 
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making” (c.f., 
Article 13, Section 16, 1987 Philippine Constitution), this paper raises the question: Is inflation 
targeting preferred by Filipinos?  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Survey data from the transition period of Philippine inflation targeting are relevant to determine if 
Filipinos have preference for inflation targeting. Yet, no survey was conducted or commissioned 
by BSP during that juncture. This study therefore relies on other sources. 
 In 2001, the World Values Survey 2000 was administered in the Philippines through the 
Social Weather Stations. That survey contained 1,200 randomly sampled respondents across the 
country. One section of the survey is applicable to the issue examined in this paper, namely: 
V122: If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is 
most important? 
 
FIRST 
CHOICE  
SECOND 
CHOICE 
Maintaining order in the country   1 1 
Giving people more say in important govt. decisions   2 2 
 4
Fighting rising prices  
Protecting freedom of speech  
 3 
 4 
3 
4 
Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]   9 9 
 
V123: And which would be the next most important? 
 
Following Pavot et al. (1991), who find that people who say they are happy tend to smile more, 
the conjecture in this paper is that respondents who said that “fighting rising prices” as the most 
important policy concern said so because of negative experiences with inflation.3 Ideally, the 
survey should have inquired on the maximum inflation rate the respondent can tolerate to get an 
implicit constraint on “fighting rising prices”. What can be inferred given the absence of the 
information is that the respondents interpreted “fighting rising prices” as price stability (i.e., 
minimal rise in price) and not price control (i.e., no increase in price). In fact, in another context, 
Valdepeñas (2004) explains price stability meant minimal rise in price.  
 Given that BSP prefers inflation targeting, a determination that Filipinos prefer “fighting 
rising prices” imply preference for inflation targeting. Indeed, initial review of the data suggests 
that is the case. Table 1 shows that 276 (23%) responded “fighting rising prices” as their first 
choice (second most frequent first choice) and 413 (34%) responded “fighting rising prices” as 
second choice (most frequent second choice). Looking at paired combinations of first and second 
choices finds “fighting rising prices” as the first choice and “maintaining order in country” as the 
second choice (and vice versa) accounted for 477 (40%) responses, the highest among possible 
combinations.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 In the survey, “fighting rising prices” is coded using the value of 3. For the analysis, the 
number is recoded to 1 and the rest as 0. The same is done to the second choice responses. Next, 
define preference as the sum of “fighting rising prices” as the first and second choices; that is, a 
value of 1 means that the respondent prefers inflation targeting and 0 means otherwise. 
                                                 
3 See Kahneman and Thaler (1991) and Kahneman et al. (1998) on the so-called “experienced utility”.  
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 Thus, the expected value of “fighting rising prices” is the probability, πi, of getting the 
response modeled in logistic form: E(“fighting rising prices”) = Pr(“fighting rising prices” = 1|πi) 
= πi. That is, πi = ze−+1
1
, where z = α + Xβ; X represents the individual characteristics and β is a 
vector of parameters. Indicators include socio-economic profile, class or income deciles, self-
assessment, and job status. Table 2 presents the frequency distribution.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 Socioeconomic Profile: Standard indicators like age, gender, and education are used in 
the analysis. The dataset contains the actual ages of respondents. The information is further 
classified according to age deciles then coded accordingly (i.e., from 1 for the lowest age bracket 
to 8 for the highest age bracket). Gender means male or female. Education attainment was 
regrouped so as to simplify secondary education categories then recoded accordingly (i.e., from 1 
for no formal education to 7 for completed university education).4 
 Class or Income Status: Two sets of information are available in the dataset: class and 
income deciles. For analysis, class information is recoded to have consistency in the sequencing 
of numbers (i.e., 1 for lower class to 4 for upper class) with that of income deciles, which follow 
standard coding (i.e., 1 for the poorest to 10 for the richest). 
 Self-Assessment of Status: The first set of information is the individual assessment of 
happiness and health. For consistency, data were recoded (i.e., 1 to mean not at all happy or poor 
to 4 to mean very good or very happy). The other set is the individual assessment of financial 
status and life in general, which follow standard coding (i.e., 1 is completely dissatisfied and 10 is 
completely satisfied). To avoid simultaneity bias, only paired combinations of the first and 
second sets of self-assessment responses are used in the analysis.5 
                                                 
4 Here “secondary education” comprises technical, vocational, or pre-university preparatory type schooling. 
5 Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) find that using happiness and life satisfaction as dependent variables 
give similar results. Thus, simultaneity bias may explain why they turn out to be statistically insignificant 
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 Jobs Status: The type of employment is available in the dataset; that is, whether the 
respondent is unemployed, employed (if so, whether employment is full-time, part-time, or self-
employed), or not-in-the-labor-force (i.e., retiree, housewife, or student). Data are relabeled for 
consistency then recoded accordingly (i.e., 1 if unemployed, 2 if part-time, 3 if full-time, 4 if self-
employed, and 5 if not in the labor force). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3a summarizes results using logistic regressions. The expected probabilities that Filipinos 
with characteristics Xi, Yi, etc. choose “fighting rising prices” are in the Appendix. Gender comes 
out statistically insignificant perhaps caused by data structure (notice the equal number of male 
and female respondents in Table 2). Removing gender does not imply that it is not an important 
factor in making choices. Still, results are not altered after removing gender from the model. 
Through the process of elimination, model 5 emerges as the most helpful result. The last column 
of Table 3a shows the marginal effects of the statistically significant variables.  
[Inserts Table 3a and 3b Here] 
 The positive notation in column 9 (of Table 3a) indicates that the older, healthier, and 
employed Filipinos are more likely to prefer inflation targeting. The sizes of the marginal effects 
indicate that age and health are the stronger determinants of preference than job status. From 
Table 3b, there is at least 50% probability of preferring inflation targeting; that is, inflation is a 
general concern of Filipinos. 
                Healthy Filipinos support inflation targeting because the alternative (i.e., being sickly or 
less healthy) is costly. Even with government-sponsored health programs, there remains no 
meaningful health insurance program that covers for medicines and hospitalization. The finding 
that there is at least a 50% probability that inflation targeting is supported by Filipinos regardless 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the analysis (Table 3a).  
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of their health status is not difficult to understand (Table 3b). Being healthy is important because 
it affords the person more opportunities to work and enjoy life. 
 The reason the employed support inflation targeting is straightforward. Those with jobs 
support inflation targeting more because people want earnings to translate into more goods and 
services. The same applies to the retirees, housewives and students, who want to fully enjoy their 
limited pensions, budgets, or allowances. Interestingly, though, those who are unemployed are 
least likely to support inflation targeting, albeit odds exceeds 50% probability in favor of the 
policy (Table 3b). Perhaps because unemployment is basically a structural problem and not an 
option that the unemployed also perceive inflation as a structural problem: feeling helpless 
towards unemployment. Besides, where job security is absent and labor unions are weak, people 
feel powerless with regard to the labor market and outcomes. 
 Moreover, the first set of results are consistent with standard life-cycle analysis, which 
says that as one grows older the person takes on more responsibilities but the risks associated 
with health, job status, and old-age increase as well. The findings are not surprising in the context 
of the Philippines, where social security and basic services are inadequate if not defective and 
even inequitable. 
  Table 3a furthermore shows that the educated and better-off Filipinos and those who are 
relatively satisfied with their financial status are less likely to support inflation targeting. These 
findings appear counter-intuitive at first glance given that these people lose the most in an 
inflationary environment. Looking at the Philippine setting again sheds light why such is the case.  
 Obviously, more educated Filipinos are better in accessing and processing information, 
effectively enjoying more freedoms than the less educated ones. Matched with sufficient financial 
resources, educated Filipinos not only have but also can make “better” choices. If the domestic 
conditions are objectionable (e.g., domestic prices are unacceptable, product quality is poor, etc), 
the educated and the well-off can seek foreign markets. In any case, Engel’s Law says that the 
wealthy can afford basic goods and services regardless of price movements. In addition, the 
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affluent Filipinos can easily secure their welfare and wealth regardless of the domestic conditions.  
 Thus, Filipinos with little education and limited financial capacity are likely support 
inflation targeting precisely because of the limited options available to them.6 Being powerless 
with the state of affairs, underprivileged Filipinos support inflation targeting precisely because 
they want to secure their own selves notwithstanding limited financial resources.  
 So far, the discussion deals with individual preferences. The question, however, is the 
following: is it sensible to say that the preference of a poor, healthy, and young (say, in the 30s) 
Filipino who has completed university education but is unemployed be comparable to that of a 
rich, healthy, and young Filipino who has also completed university education and is 
unemployed? What is clear is that given the profile of Filipinos who preferred inflation targeting, 
the policy shift of the BSP from monetary targeting to inflation targeting can be considered a pro-
poor policy shift. 
 The next step then is to obtain the social sentiments. To that end, begin by calculating the 
total probabilities in choosing inflation targeting taking into account various individual 
characteristics. Results are detailed in the Appendix. Not surprisingly, the richest groups (deciles 
9 and 10) and unemployed are least likely to support inflation targeting because are enjoying 
passive earnings from wealth and other assets (i.e., the so-called “unemployed wealthy”). The 
richest and employed are less likely to support inflation targeting perhaps because their earnings 
are sufficiently large to cover for inflation. On the other hand, the self-employed and the not-in-
the-labor-force are likely to support inflation targeting because they face some constraints: self-
employment implies “unsteady” income flow, whereas students, retirees, and housewives merely 
receive distributions of income.  
 The structure of preferences is basically similar across income deciles, albeit preference 
for inflation targeting increases with lower income deciles. Those who belong in deciles 1 to 6, 
                                                 
6 Most Filipinos do not have adequate schooling nor meet the national and international basic education 
competency standards (c.f., Luz 2008). 
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regardless of their age, job, health and financial status, as well as education attainment have at 
least 50% probability of choosing inflation targeting.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 Finally, applying the total probability of each decile to the number of households per 
decile obtains an estimate of the overall sentiment with regards to inflation targeting in 2000 
(Table 4). Thus, the number of households who would support inflation targeting is 8.1 million or 
53.1% of Filipino households.7 Therefore, majority of Philippine society would have said they 
supported the shift to inflation targeting if asked.8 However, the findings do not suggest that the 
upper incomes Filipinos oppose inflation targeting but only that they are indifferent to it because 
inflation is not their immediate concern. Naturally, the preference can shift in favor of inflation 
targeting if inflation starts to impinge on well-being and wealth.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the shift from monetary targeting to inflation targeting 
in 2000 and the implementation began in 2002, or after two years of technical preparations and 
public consultations in the Philippines. Using World Values Survey 2000 data, analysis finds that 
at least 53.1% of all Filipino households would support inflation targeting if asked. Those in the 
lower income deciles and who are older, healthier, and employed preferred inflation targeting 
more than the highly educated and financially satisfied. As such, the shift from monetary targeting 
to inflation targeting can be considered a pro-poor policy shift. The findings strongly indicate that 
                                                 
7 Calculated as X = )policyinflation -antip( * decileper  households∑ and X is the expected number of 
households who prefer inflation targeting. Data are in Table 4 and Appendix.  
8 It will be interesting to examine if after ten years of implementing the policy Filipinos still prefer inflation 
targeting. As noted earlier, there is no study on the maximum inflation rate Filipinos can tolerate (i.e., their 
inflation threshold) under alternative scenarios (e.g., growth, stagnation, and contraction). It is worthwhile 
to also study Filipino attitudes on the tradeoffs between inflation and, say, unemployment, hunger, growth, 
environmental sustainability, etc. 
 10
the preference of Philippine society as a whole was in line with preference of the Bangko Sentral 
ng Pilipinas for inflation targeting.  
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Table 1: Distribution of responses 
 
                                        Second choice 
First choice 1 2 3 4 Total  
                   1   177   307   131      615  
                   2    85     86    48      219  
                   3  170    51     55      276  
                   4    44    26    20         90  
             Total  299  254  413  234   1,200  
Source of data: World Values Survey 2000.  
 
Definitions: 
1 = Maintaining order in the nation 
2 = Giving people more say in important government decisions 
3 = Fighting rising prices 
4 = Protecting freedom of speech 
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Table 4: Number of households in 2000, by decile (in 1,000s) 
                                        
Decile Number  Prob. Expected No. 
   1:         under - 29,999 1,241 0.69    861 
   2:       30,000 - 39,999 1,339  0.66    881 
   3:       40,000 - 49,999 1,503 0.62    933 
   4:       50,000 - 59,999 1,409 0.58    821 
   5:       60,000 - 79,999 2,252 0.53 1,198 
   6:       80,000 - 99,999 1,630 0.50    818 
   7:   100,000 - 149,000 2,553  0.46 1,177 
   8:   150,000 - 249,000 2,060 0.44    898 
   9:   250,000 - 499,000 1,044 0.41    425 
 10:   500,000 -    above  237 0.38      91 
Total 15,268  8,104 
Source of data: National Statistics Office and Appendix for the probabilities.  
Calculations of author. 
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N
ot
e:
 C
al
cu
la
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 a
ut
ho
r. 
U
N
E
 =
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
; P
A
R
T
 =
 p
ar
t-
tim
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t; 
FU
L
L
 =
 fu
ll-
tim
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t; 
SE
L
F 
= 
se
lf
-e
m
pl
oy
ed
; N
L
F 
= 
no
t 
in
 th
e 
la
bo
r f
or
ce
.  
 
 A
ss
um
pt
io
ns
: 
1.
 H
ea
lth
y-
an
d-
em
pl
oy
ed
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 h
ea
lth
y-
an
d-
no
t-
in
-t
he
-l
ab
or
-f
or
ce
 h
av
e 
“v
er
y 
go
od
” 
(4
) 
se
lf
-a
ss
es
sm
en
t 
of
 o
w
n 
he
al
th
. H
ea
lth
y-
an
d-
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 h
av
e 
“g
oo
d”
 (
3)
 s
el
f-
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
of
 o
w
n 
he
al
th
. 
U
nh
ea
lth
y-
an
d-
em
pl
oy
ed
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 u
nh
ea
lth
y-
an
d-
no
t-
in
-t
he
-l
ab
or
-f
or
ce
 
ha
ve
 “
go
od
” 
(3
) s
el
f-
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f o
w
n 
he
al
th
. U
nh
ea
lth
y-
an
d-
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 h
av
e 
“f
ai
r”
 (2
) s
el
f-
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f o
w
n 
he
al
th
. 
2.
 D
ec
ile
s 
7 
to
 1
0 
ha
ve
 c
om
pl
et
ed
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
(7
), 
de
ci
le
 6
 h
as
 i
nc
om
pl
et
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
(6
), 
de
ci
le
 5
 h
as
 c
om
pl
et
ed
 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
(5
), 
de
ci
le
 4
 h
as
 i
nc
om
pl
et
e 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
(4
), 
de
ci
le
 3
 h
as
 c
om
pl
et
ed
 p
ri
m
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
(3
), 
de
ci
le
 2
 h
as
 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 d
ec
ile
 1
 h
as
 n
o 
fo
rm
al
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
(1
). 
3.
 D
ec
ile
 s
ta
tu
s 
al
so
 c
or
re
sp
on
ds
 to
 s
el
f-
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f o
w
n 
fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
tu
s.
 
4.
 R
et
ir
em
en
t i
s 
ag
e 
65
 b
ut
 m
ay
 s
til
l w
or
k 
un
til
 a
ge
 6
9 
th
en
 c
la
ss
if
ie
d 
as
 s
el
f-
em
pl
oy
ed
 fr
om
 a
ge
 7
0 
or
 re
tir
ed
. 
